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THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT
AND MASS MEDIA
D. H. W. HENRY,

Q.C.*

Mr. Henry describes the rationale and scope of the Combines Investigation Act and its application to the mass media, particularlythe press, to date.
He notes the narrow interpretationgiven to the Act by the courts and raises
several questions suggested by the application of a competitive policy to the
mass media. Mr. Henry's comments reflect Commissioner Johnson's analysis
of the use of anti-combines legislation to control undue concentration of
ownership with its detrimentaleffect on diversity and creativity. The objectives
of the mass media in Canada have been set out in the BroadcastingAct and
any comparison between the Canadianand American anti-combinesprovisions
to the media must be made in light of the different mandates of the Federal
Communications Commission and the Canadian Radio-Television
Commission.

INTRODUCTION
I should like to express the view that the problems of competition, concentration and monopoly are of very great relevance to the entire communications industry. Because the media of communications are, in effect, the
nervous system of society, there is no field in which excessive concentration
or anti-competitive practices can be of greater concern to society. It might be
helpful, therefore, to mention the extent to which the anti-combines laws
apply to various sectors of the communications industry.
Rationale of "Combines Investigation Act"'-Competition Policy
The basic purpose of the legislation has been stated in the Supreme
Court of Canada as being "for the protection of the public interest in free
competition". In this statute Parliament has embodied what has been
described as the competition policy of Canada. By enacting this legislation
Parliament has assumed the continuation in Canada of a free private enterprise economy, actuated by the profit motive and governed by a competitive
market. In such an environment, those who wish to compete for economic
gain should be free to do so without being subjected to artificial restraints
*Director of Investigation and Research Combines Investigation Act. This paper was
originally prepared as part of a presentation to-the Special Senate Committee on Mass
Media, January 20, 1970.
1 Combines Investigation Act R.S.C. 1952 c.314.
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imposed upon them by competitors or other members of trade or industry. In
essence, the law contemplates the regulation of the economy, to the largest
extent possible, by the impersonal forces of competition rather than regulation of the economy by members of industry itself.
This concept tends to emphasize the importance of economic efficiency
and the passing on of the fruits of that efficiency to society. It is also true to
say that another important objective of competition policy, although it is not
one that has been emphasized in Canada, has been the diffusion of economic
power whereby it is sought to avoid concentration of too much power in too
few hands. This objective has been, perhaps, more clearly articulated and
accepted in the United States. Nevertheless, it is obviously a very important
objective and is indeed more so in relation to the field of communications
where concentration of power has not only very important economic consequences but even more important social consequences.
In Canada, we do not, of course, have a state of perfect competition;
this is, indeed, a textbook concept. Nor do we have many significant areas
of pure monopoly. Our market economy is, in fact, a mix, in varying degrees,
of elements of imperfect competition and public regulation, the latter occurring
sometimes in industries that tend to be natural monopolies, such as transportation and public utilities. The state has also intervened in the areas of agriculture and resource industries by the formation of production and marketing
boards; and for reasons of social policy, in the field of broadcasting. With
respect to such interventions the Economic Council of Canada has observed:
"Among the most common reasons for instituting economic regulation is the
desire to control business conduct and performance in industries with an inherent
tendency towards natural monopoly. Presumably, regulation is here introduced in
an effort to achieve what the market plus competition policy cannot do in the way
of ensuring efficiency in the use of resources, the protection of consumers from
exploitation and the preservation of the health and safety of the public. However,
not all economically significant regulations are formulated exclusively on economicefficiency or consumer-protection grounds. At times, governments have imposed
regulations designed to achieve other objectives such as safeguarding national
culture, ensuring a national presence in institutions considered vital to sovereignty,
or limiting hours of work and the number of outlets offering particular goods and
services in given locations. These may be valid objectives, but their pursuit may
impose economic costs, which should as far as possible be estimated, publicly
discussed, and taken continuously into account as the regulatory process goes
forward."

Scope of "Combines InvestigationAct"
The anti-combines laws are now found entirely in the Combines Investigation Act. The original statute which dealt with agreements in restraint of
trade was enacted in 1889. It is a criminal statute which seeks to give effect
to the rationale that I have outlined by prohibiting certain defined conduct
with penal consequences.
The Act prohibits activity in three main areas:
(a) Combinations that prevent or lessen unduly competition in the
production, purchase, sale, storage, rental, transportation or
supply of commodities or in the price of insurance.
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(b) Mergers or monopolies that may operate to the detriment of
the public.
(c) Unfair trade practices including price discrimination, predatory
pricing, certain promotional allowances, resale price maintenance and misleading advertising.
The combination provision is designed to prevent certain collusive
restraints on competition by private arrangements made between businessmen. The most usual situations involve price-fixing, market-sharing, group
boycotts of competitors or outlets, profit-sharing, and the like. Such agreements are found horizontally among competitors and can also exist vertically
among suppliers and their distribution system.
While the combination and trade practices provisions are probably not
of central interest to the Communications industry it is worth pointing out that
they have some relevance to the study. It is of considerable importance to the
continuation of a viable enterprise in the communications industry that it
minimize its cost of doing business. Such a business is entitled to obtain
the benefits of competition in the supply of the equipment and materials upon
which it depends for its operation. If, for example, as has been suggested,
there is a combine in the newsprint industry, that would inevitably have the
effect of maintaining the price of newsprint at a higher level than it need be and
would be of significance in increasing the cost of producing the newspaper.2
In other words, the provisions of the legislation designed to maintain a
competitive environment are of great importance to the industry in minimizing
the cost of the goods which it has to buy, whether for use in the broadcasting
media or the press.
Mergers3
Only two merger cases 4 of any importance have reached the courts and
in each case the court held that the merger did not constitute a breach of the
Act 5. These judicial decisions were made in proceedings brought under the
predecessor of the present sections, but as the previously existing principles
have been carried forward into the present provisions, there is little reason
to expect that the courts will consider that the effect of these two decisions has
been nullified or altered. Neither case was carried through to an appeal and
the judgments therefore stand as judgments of the trial division in each case.

2 This situation was dealt with in the Report of the Director of Investigation and
Research under the Combines Investigation Act for the year ended March 31, 1966, at
pages 12-15.
3

See Combines Investigation Act s. 33 (2) (c).
R. v. Canadian Breweries Limited [1960] O.R. 601, (hereafter cited as The Beer
Case); and Regina v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. [1960] W.W.R.
(n.s.) 577 (cited as The Western Sugar Case).
5 In a recent case, Regina v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada, there was a
plea of guilty on January 12, 1970.
4
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To upset the principles established would require additional cases brought
before the appellate courts and ultimately before the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The following points may be made as a result of this experience:
(a) A merger is not unlawful unless it limits competition to the
"detriment of the public". This expression has not been defined
by Parliament and it is therefore left to the courts to give it
more particular meaning.
(b) Where the industry was regulated by valid provincial legislation
it was withdrawn to that extent from the operation of the
Combines Investigation Act. The public agency concerned is
expected to protect the public interest rather than the economic
6
forces operating in the competitive market.
(c) Thus far, the courts have looked at the effect of the merger on
competition, as the statute requires, but have held that
competition must be virtually stifled before the merger can
be struck down under the law.7
(d) The court, in the Western Sugar Case,8 placed the Crown under
the additional burden of proving that prices and profits were
excessive or exorbitant.
(e) As the provisions create a criminal offence, the onus is on the
Crown to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.
(f)

The courts have been reluctant to enter into any sophisticated
economic analysis of the situation resulting from the merger
and have tended in lieu thereof to find a reasonable doubt in
the face of evidence of some competition remaining.

(g) The virtual monopoly test is open to challenge on the
basis of other judicial pronouncements, but as long as a virtual
monopoly test for mergers persists, the merger provision as a
practical measure is rendered nugatory. There is clearly no
possibility that it could be used to arrest monopoly in its
incipiency; it could be invoked only iii the final stages of
monopolization when concentration has proceeded far beyond
the degree where competition remains an effective force.
It should be observed that one important underlying factor in bringing
about this state of affairs is the criminal nature of the merger provisions. The

6 See the Beer Case supra. n. 4.
7 Regina v. CanadianBreweries Ltd. [1960] O.R. 601 particularly at 605 where the
trial judge applies the dictum of Ca.rwright J. as he then was in Regina v. Abitibi Power
& Paper Co. Ltd. (1961) 131 C.C.C. Ann. 201, CPR 188, establishing the virtual
monopoly test.

8supra. n. 4.
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Crown is required to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the effect
of the acquisition, which is a matter of economic analysis and judgment, is
detrimental to the public so as to vest the acquiring company with criminal
liability. This is a very difficult onus to discharge in the field of economic
analysis.
The emasculation of the merger provisions clearly limits the number of
cases than can be responsibly brought forward for investigation and enforcement in the courts; yet without some further references to the courts, and
particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, it is impossible to reinstate the
provision judicially. While this might be done in time, the obvious practical
alternative is revision of the legislation.
This need has been recognized and, indeed, the Economic Council of
Canada has recommended that a different technique for controlling mergers
in Canada should be introduced. This would call for the setting up of a
tribunal which would deal with mergers referred to in a civil or non-criminal
context and a decision made as to the desirability or otherwise from the
standpoint of the public interest in the light of broad tests relating to the
effect of the merger on competition and efficiency. To do so, however, raises
questions of constitutional law that will have to be resolved. In the past the
Privy Council and Supreme Court of Canada have held that the Combines
Investigation Act is valid legislation under the criminal law power in section
91 of the B.N.A. Act, but have struck down two attempts to extend the
provisions of the law into the civil field. Since these are matters of national
concern, however, it becomes of obvious importance to find an effective way
to place limits on the extent to which the operation of market forces can be
seriously impaired through the merger route, at the same time giving scope
to those acquisitions which increase economic efficiency without undue impairment of competition.
In the meantime, the existing legislation must be administered. The
Director therefore proceeds on the assumption that the legislation must be
given some meaning. For this purpose the virtual monopoly test is not applied
but for purposes of administration and enforcement a decision is made on the
basis of whether competition has been impaired by the merger, or concentration has increased to the extent that it may fairly and responsibly be argued
before a court that the line has been crossed with resulting public detriment.
The administrators, however, must recognize that Canadian trial courts are not
likely to strike down a merger unless it produces a very high degree of
concentration in the market which is not accompanied by some degree of
competition.
Monopolies9
Until this year there was only one judicial decision in a monopoly case in
Canada, and that decision seems to have been made in the light of such clear
9 See Combines Investigation Act s. 33 (2) (f).
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evidence of abusive practices that it does not provide a very useful criterion
for determining what the judicial attitude is likely to be in future to
monopolies as such. It is apparent that the legislation does not strike down
monopoly as such but provides that abuse or likely abuse of monopoly, i.e.,
operation of the monopoly to the detriment of the public constitutes the
proscribed conduct.
GeneralApplication of the anti-combines laws to the Communications
Industry
As stated earlier the problems of competition, concentration, and
monopoly are of very great relevance to the entire communications industry.
Some of the media of communication compete with others; some only compete with others to a limited degree; and others stand in a category by themselves. In some cases the message and the vehicle for communicating it go
together; in other cases they are separate. One cannot obtain the printed
message contained in a newspaper, magazine or book without buying the
article at the same time, but in the case of broadcast messages one buys the
radio or television set without at the same time buying the message which is
conveyed in a separate operation. Similarly, one rents the telephone or
computer without the message which is later separately conveyed over this
equipment.
The Combines Investigation Act does not apply equally in all areas of
the communications industry. In this respect there are two things that must
be said.
In the first place, the Act generally speaking applies only to situations that
involve goods. What may be termed "pure?' services are not covered by the
Act, although the specified services of storage, rental, and transportation of
goods and the price of insurance are included. Apart from that, services are
not specifically included.
In the second place, it has been held by the courts that, to the extent
that an industry is regulated under valid provincial or federal legislation, the
industry concerned is not subject to the Combines Investigation Act. Thus,
where rates charged by a transportation company are fixed by a regulatory
board, the industry is not subject to the Act in relation to the rates so
determined.
The following therefore may be said with respect to particular areas of
the field of communications:
(a) Newspapers (including dailies, weeklies, periodicals and
magazines): In this case the publisher sells an article, i.e., the
newspaper, periodical, etc., to the consumer. While the objective is to convey a message, the message cannot be obtained
without buying the thing; therefore, restraint of trade activities
with respect to these products are subject to the Act.
(b) Books: The position is the same as with newspapers.
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(c) Films: This is somewhat more complicated. The exhibitor
of the film, for example, the theatre owner, rents the film from
the distributor in order to exhibit it. This appears to be an
article within the meaning of the Act and its production and
rental are subject to the provisions of the Act. The exhibiting
of the film to the patrons of a theatre, however, is a service
which does not at present come under the terms of the Act.
(d) Broadcasting (radio, television and CATV): The broadcasting
of the message constitutes a service which does not come
within the scope of the Act. This is distinct from the equipment needed to receive the message. It is purchased or rented
by the consumer in a separate operation and this equipment,
like other consumer goods, is subject to the provisions of the
Act. In addition, this part of the industry is subject to
important regulatory control through the Canadian RadioTelevision Commission which is intended to protect the public
interest.
(e) Telephone, telegraph and telex services: As in the case of
broadcasting, these are services that do not fall within the
provisions of the Act. However, to the extent that equipment
is rented by the user of the service, such as in the case of the
telephone instrument and the telex equipment, these transactions could be subject to the Act, but charges for the actual
communication of the message would not. In addition, the
rates charged the user of the service are set by the Canadian
Transport Commission.
(f) Computers and data banks: The process of programming and
information retrieval by itself constitutes a service which would
not come under the Act. However, the purchase or rental of
equipment necessary to make use of the service would be subject to the Act.
(g) Advertising: Except for sections 33C and 33D which prohibit
misleading advertising, this activity is not as such subject to
the Act.
From the foregoing it will be seen that printed publications are to be
regarded as articles within the meaning of the anti-combines laws so as to
justify formal inquiry under the Act in relation to mergers, monopolistic
situations, combines and other prohibited activities. In the field of telecommunications, however, the situation is different. The services concerned
are not covered by the Act. This may not, however, preclude a formal
inquiry under the Act into certain aspects of the activities of firms in this
area. While it may not be possible to apply the Act to the services themselves,
it may be possible to approach the situations involving undue concentration
in another way. For example, in the case of the current inquiry into Bell
Telephone (which is public knowledge), the line of inquiry concerns the
impact on the independent manufacturers of telecommunications equipment
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of Bell's near monopoly position as a purchaser of such equipment and of its
control of an important unregulated supplier. It would similarly be of concern
if a telecommunications company insisted that its own or designated makes
of computer or information retrieval equipment could alone be attached to its
system, as this could give it control over the development of the equipment
and ultimately, remotely over sources of information.
Formal Inquiries Involving the Communications Media
There have been eight formal inquiries under the Combines Investigation
Act into various aspects of the mass media. Three of these involved newspaper mergers and have been the subject of reports by the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission which have been published. 10 The other five are current
matters," which being, so to speak, sub judice, it would not be proper to dis-

10 The inquiries are:
(a) An inquiry concerning the Production and Supply of Newspapers in the City
of Vancouver and elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia (R.T.P.C. report
dated August 16, 1970). [Recognizing the importance of the press and consequently
the necessity of diversity and independent editorial policy but also the economic
realities the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission approved a merger of the
two Vancouver papers subject to a series of undertakings to insure editorial
independence. The Commission also rejected the use of a "package" advertising
I
scheme used by the two papers as being contrary to the public good.]
(b) Inquiry into the Production, Distribution and Supply of Newspapers in the
Sudbury-Copper Cliff area (R.T.P.C. report dated February 26, 1964). [The Commission did not find any abuse of monopoly power to eliminate a potential competitor where the established monopolistic daily paper, after hearing of the plans
regarding the commencement of a weekly, started its own weekly so that its
competitor never operated at a profit and ceased publication.]
(c)Inquiry relating to the Acquisition in 1962 of the Times-Journal Newspaper
published in Fort William, Ontario (R.T.P.C. report dated March 30, 1965). [The
Commission, on an analysis of circulation patterns, rejected the allegation that
the acquisition of the Fort William paper by the Port Arthur News Chronicle was
an unlawful merger, on the ground that the two papers were not in competition, as
each were a monopoly in their own independent market prior to the merger.]
11 (a) Inquiry relating to the Production, Purchase, Sale and Supply of books in
the Province of Quebec. This inquiry involves a price-fixing conspiracy in relation
to two classes of French language books sold in the Province of Quebec school text-books and other books. Legal proceedings have been instituted against
a number of publishers and suppliers of books in the Province of Quebec. The
case is at present before the courts.
(b) Inquiry relating to the Distribution and Rental of Motion Picture Film.
This inquiry, the existence of which was made public by the trade, concerns alleged
restrictive practices in relation to the distribution of films through motion picture
threatres.
(c) Inquiry relating to the Manufacture, Production, Distribution, Purchase,
Supply and Sale of Communications Systems, Communications Equipment and
Related Products. See the Annual Report of the Director of Investigation and
Research for the year ended March 31, 1968, at page 54 and Proceedings of the
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, December 7, 1967, p. 385.
(d) One other inquiry is in progress in the sector relating to the press which
cannot be identified until a report is published or legal proceedings are commenced.
(e)Inquiry relating to the Production, Supply and Distribution of Newspapers in
the Province of New Brunswick.
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12
cuss except to the extent that they have clearly become public knowledge.
These inquiries may be taken to indicate that a considerable degree of
attention has been given to restrictive situations or practices in the field of
the mass media, having regard to the limitations of the law and the need to
spread the resources of the Director's office over a very wide range of
activities in the economy.

Conclusion:
This in general is how competition principles have been applied to the
mass media. In concluding I would like to make a number of points and
raise questions directed particularly to the mass media.
In the background is the fact that the mass media are businesses. Commercial profitability becomes the dominating necessity for the publisher or
owner. The publication of news and opinions must be secondary to this,
certainly in the long run.
Secondly, while an information medium is a business, the way that
business is handled has far more important consequences for society than in
the case of, say, manufacturing. Because the media of communications are,
in effect, the nervous system of society, there is no field in which the
structure and control of the industry, as well as the quality and availability
of the product are more important.
What is here in issue is a very important aspect of power in the state.
The broad national objective regarding the mass media is presumably that
set out in the Broadcasting Act.13 The communications system should be
effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada.
There are important sub-objectives:
(a) Freedom to inform, interpret and comment and to stimulate
debate: With this is the necessity of editorial independence
sufficiently certain to withstand economic and political pressures.

(b) Variety: Because of the paramount public interest in the
development of informed opinion, diversity assumes an importance in itself. The public is entitled to hear all points of
view.
(c) The public is entitled to a high standard of excellence of the
product and that it be readily available at a reasonable cost.
12 The

existence of these last inquiries has been disclosed in the press and elsewhere.

Further information about them, however, cannot be disclosed until a report is published
or legal proceedings are commenced. The long-standing policy relating to the confidentiality of inquiries was explained by the Government leader in the Senate on
December 9, 1969, in answer to question No. 1, Senate Hansard, page 296.
13 Broadcasting Act S.C. 1967-68 c. 25.
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(d) An economically viable industry which will be, firstly, a
commercial base for operations of the particular publication,
and secondly, will permit the continued distribution of information, ideas and entertainment, as well as advertising, from
that base.
Thirdly, it is submitted that any study of a particular medium must be in
the context of the total communications industry. One element ought not to
be considered in isolation. This industry is a mix having several characteristics. While some areas are regulated under legislation, (radio, television,
CATV, and telecommunications, including satellites), others are free of
direct regulation and are operating in a competitive market (the press, motion
picture films, computers and information storage and retrieval). Practically
all, however, are in the private sector operating as businesses in the free
competitive enterprise system - CBC is the notable exception. The various
media may in some respects compete with each other, but they are not
necessarily perfect substitutes for each other or fully competitive with each
other. Each has its own particular role to play and its own identifiable
market. It is perhaps best to say that they complement one another. The
future relationship between broadcasting, the press and information retrieval
systems is not likely to be static. It is important, therefore, to lay a framework
for future flexibility so as to make the media responsive to public demand from
time to time in order to provide the public with the best product and service
from all.
As a general principle, regulation should be kept to a minimum. This
means regulation by the state as well as regulation by entrepreneurs holding
the reins of power. Where competition can operate and is allowed to operate,
it will ordinarily produce a more efficient enterprise and a better product and
service than under regulation. In the field of the mass media, there is, of
course, the added need to protect freedom of expression from unnecessary and
unacceptable restraints. Moreover, administration of an industry by its own
members in the long run is not likely to accord with the true public interest.
Recognizing existing areas of regulation, it is submitted that any regulatory measures should be aimed at preserving a competitive environment and
limiting or restraining monopoly, monopolization and anti-competitive practices. The Royal Commission on the Press in Great Britain observed:
... The danger in a newspaper monopoly - that is, a newspaper without any
competition - is that the monopolist, by its selection of the news and the manner
in which it reports it, and by its commentary on public affairs, is in a position to
determine what people shall read about the events and issues of the day, and to
exert a strong influence on their opinions. Even if this position is not consciously
abused, a paper without competitors may fall below the standards of accuracy and
efficiency which competition enforces...-14

Lack of competition tends to deprive the publication of its virility and
to make it insipid, seeking to please everybody. It may sidestep issues, notably
14

Royal Commission on the Press 1947-1949, (Great Britain) Report, para. 274
(in part).
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election issues, which should be debated, thus dampening discussion; at oiIer'
times it may straddle the fence on controversial matters.
There are certain aspects of ownership that are pertinent; it is submitted that common ownership or control of a number of competing media in
the long run negates true competition. Notwithstanding the common owners
policy of the independence of the various units, the power exists to stifle that
independence in an instant; at the very least the policy may change with
changes in ownership. Chain ownership is thought by some to be too impersonal and too neutral, thus affecting the quality of the product. Foreign
ownership, which at present does not characterize the mass media, may be
the means of injecting new capital into the industry but is at variance with
the broad objectives of Canadian ownership. The anti-combines laws in their
present form constitute too blunt an instrument to deal with concentration
in its incipiency and are probably too flexible to deal effectively with the real
issues involved in continuing concentration in mass media. 15
I suggest this analysis raises the following questions:
(1) If we must accept some degree of concentration has it gone
too far? This must be considered in relation to
(a) individual markets,
(b) Canada as a whole, and
(c) the larger market of all communication media.
(2) How can further concentration be arrested if necessary?
(a) by facilitating new entries through encouraging
technological change or by means of subsidies or
guaranteed loans?
(b) by prohibiting monopolization through new statutory
provisions?
(c) by statutory regulation of the industry structure such
as requiring public approval of mergers and takeovers within a medium or between media?
(3) Can complementary media be made more directly competitive
so as to stimulate improvement of their quality and
performance?
(4) Is the public getting the media it deserves? Can the public
need for more information and viewpoint be better identified?
Can a vehicle be found to enable the public to be more
effective in shaping editorial policy on news coverage and
controversial issues? (e.g., if a Press Council is a possible
development, should it not contain strong reader representa-

15 Following the Interim Report of the Economic Council of Canada on Competition Policy, July, 1969, revisions of the Act are being studied.
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tion?). Just as university students are now more effectively
articulating their needs and influencing academic programs,
ought not the public too be given a similar opportunity vis-a-vis
the media?
(5) Can the competitive performance of media be improved by
awards for excellence in journalism or scholarships and other
incentives to attract greater numbers of capable students into
the field?
(6) Would a provision comparable to section 20 of the National
TransportationAct,16 which requires mergers of transportation
companies to be reported to the Director of Investigation and
Research by the Canadian Transport Commission, be appropriate in relation to the Canadian Radio-Television Commission
and the broadcasting media?
16 National Transportation Act, 1966-67 c. 69.

